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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 17, 2014, several riots in the Manus Islands detention center 
left a twenty-three year old Iranian refugee, Reza Barati, dead.1  Eyewitness 
reports suggest that Barati had been beaten, he had been hit with a nail 
embedded stick.  A rock was also lifted and thrown down on his head,2 and 
he eventually succumbed to these injuries.  This horrific incident is not the 
only tragedy to emerge from Australia’s policy of mandatory offshore 
detention in a camp on a small Pacific settlement miles from the mainland.  
On this day, not only Barati suffered; witnesses to his murder have since 
been forced into solitary confinement, threatened, and tortured.3   
Additionally, thousands of refugees and asylum seekers have been returned 
to countries from which they initially fled.  Members of the Tamil minority 
of Sri Lanka, specifically, have been returned to their island state to face 
ongoing persecution and human rights abuses.4 
This Note analyzes whether Australia’s asylum procedures concerning non-
refoulement5 and the offshore detention facilities located on Nauru and the 
Manus Islands in Papua New Guinea violate the 1987 U.N. Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(Convention or CAT).  Part II of this Note will lay the foundation and 
background information concerning the specific incidents to be analyzed.  Part 
III of this Note will focus on the relevant jurisprudence regarding the various 
interpretations of the CAT.  This Part will specifically analyze two issues; first, 
what exactly constitutes “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”6 which is barred by the Convention, and second what is the role 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Oliver Laughland, Manus Violence: Dead Asylum Seeker Named as Iranian Reza Barati, 
23, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/manus-de 
ad-asylum-seeker-iranian-reza-berati. 
 2 Kerry Brewster & Deb Richards, Manus Island Riot: Asylum Seeker Speaks of Witnessing 
Reza Barati’s Death, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/ 
news/2014-04-04/manus-island-asylum-seekers-witness-statements-reza-berati-death/5367118. 
 3 Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment), Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, ¶¶ 23–26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/Add. 1 (Mar. 
5, 2015) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur]. 
 4 Id. ¶¶ 20–22.  
 5 According to non-refoulement, a state may not return or extradite an individual to another 
state when there is a substantial risk that the individual may face persecution or the violation 
of human rights.  Am. Soc’y Int’l L., Human Rights, BENCHBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 50, 
at III.E-50 (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014), http://www.asil.org/benchbook/humanrights.pdf. 
 6 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, arts. 1, 16 [hereinafter Convention Against 
Torture]. 
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of the Convention in preventing non-refoulement.7  Part IV of this Note will 
apply the relevant jurisprudence in an effort to determine whether Australia 
violates the Convention either through the conditions of its offshore detention 
facilities or through the practice of returning Sri Lankan asylum seekers.  As 
an aside, this Note acknowledges that several other treaties, mainly the United 
Nations Charter,8 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,9 the 1951 
Refugee Convention10 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,11 are pertinent to this issue, but will not be analyzed in relation to the 
incidents discussed in this Note.  
II.  THE PROBLEMS AND INSTANCES 
There are many factors that contribute to the ill treatment and refoulement 
of refugees.  Further, numerous reported instances of human rights abuses 
exist.  The most pertinent problem is Australia’s lack of a Bill of Rights in its 
Constitution.  The murder of Reza Berati, as well as the return of Sri Lankan 
asylum seekers to Sri Lanka are two of the most highly publicized depictions 
of the ill treatment of refugees.  
A.  Australia’s Lack of a Bill of Rights or a Charter of Rights 
Australia has no Bill of Rights to ensure basic liberties of Australian 
citizens and individuals within Australian territory.12  One State in this 
federally organized country, the State of Victoria, has passed a Charter of 
Rights; however, only Victoria is bound by its terms.13  Australia’s rules of 
construction concerning legislation are statutory in nature; “statutes are to be 
read consistently with the rules of international law, but not where the clear 
words of the statute are inconsistent with that implication.”14  Australian 
legislation and statutes are automatically assumed to be in compliance with 
international law and Australia’s international obligations.  Despite this rule 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Id. art. 3.  
 8 U.N. Charter.  
 9 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 10 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention on Refugees].  
 11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 12 Jim Kennan S.C., The Role of International Human Rights Law in Australian Law, 44 
VAL. U. L. REV. 895, 895 (2010).  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id. 
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of construction, Australian courts have not readily adopted the principles of 
international law in their common law.15 
B.  The Road to Offshore Detention Centers 
Australia first began the policy of mandatory offshore detention facilities 
with the Migration Amendment Act of 1992.  The Act was implemented by 
the Keating government16 and called for the mandatory detention of all 
immigrants who tried to enter Australia without authorization.17  In 2001, the 
Howard government took matters further after the so-called “Tampa 
Affair”18 by implementing the “Pacific Solution.”19  The Pacific Solution 
encompassed at least seven new bills pertaining to refugees, including the: 
Border Protections (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act of 2001; 
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act of 2001; 
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential 
Provisions) Act of 2001; Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial 
Review) Act of 1998, passed in 2001; the Migration Legislation Amendment 
Act (No. 1) of 2001; Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 5) of 2001; 
and the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6) of 2001.20  These new 
                                                                                                                   
 15 Id. See also Mary Crock, Shadow Plays, Shifting Sands and International Refugee Law 
Convergences in the Asia-Pacific, 63 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 247 (2014). 
 16 Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.); Kaitlyn Pennington-Hill, Australia Makes 
a U-Turn With the Revival of the Pacific Solution: Should Asylum Seekers Find a New 
Destination?, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 585, 589 (2014).  
 17 Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.). 
 18 The MV Tampa was a Norwegian cargo ship that rescued 443 asylum seekers in distress 
just 140 kilometers off the coast of Christmas Island at the request of the Rescue Coordination 
Centre of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority.  The Australian government subsequently 
denied the Tampa authority to enter Australian waters.  Concerned about the severe 
overcrowding on the ship, horrible sanitary conditions, and asylum seekers in need of medical 
care, the Captain of the Tampa entered Australian waters regardless.  The Australian Special 
Air Services subsequently boarded the ship and prohibited passengers from disembarking.  
The incident concluded with 134 refugees being granted asylum by the government of New 
Zealand and the rest of the refugees being forcibly removed to Nauru while their asylum 
claims were being processed.  See William Kirtley, The Tampa Incident: The Legality of 
Ruddock v. Vadarlis Under International Law and the Implications of Australia’s New Asylum 
Policy, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 251, 253–59 (2002) for a more detailed account of the 
facts pertaining to the Tampa Affair and its repercussions.  
 19 Alexander J. Wood, The “Pacific Solution”: Refugees Unwelcome in Australia, 9 No. 3 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 22, 22 (2002).  
 20 Border Protections (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act of 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); 
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth) 
(Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); 
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Migration Legislation 
Amendment Act (No. 5) 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6) 
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bills were a “calculated attempt to discourage and punish refugees who 
followed an indirect route from their country of origin to Australia and who 
had access to protection in their regions of origin prior to embarking for 
Australia.”21   
Perhaps the most important of these acts was the Migration Amendment 
(Excision From Migration Zone) Act, because it essentially established that 
“Christmas, Ashmore, Cartier, and Cocos (Keeling) Islands were excised 
from Australia’s migration zone,”22 meaning that migrants who reach these 
designated areas were deemed outside of Australia’s territory and thus owed 
no duty of care by Australia.  Previously, these islands were deemed to be 
Australian territory.  Therefore, migrants reaching these islands were 
afforded the same rights they would have received if they had arrived to the 
Australian mainland.23  Migrants unlawfully entering these areas were unable 
to apply for visas to enter Australia except at the discretion of the Minister.24  
In 2008, the Pacific Solution formally ended25 but resurfaced in 2012.26  
Before reenacting the Pacific Solution, the Australian government 
unsuccessfully attempted to procure the so-called ‘Malaysian Solution’27 in 
2011.  This arrangement purported to transfer 800 Australian irregular 
maritime arrivals (IMA) to Malaysia in exchange for the resettlement of 
4,000 refugees from Malaysia.28  This non-binding arrangement was 
successfully challenged as a violation of the Migration Act of 1958 in 
Plaintiff M70 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.29  In its 2011 
decision, the Australian High Court emphasized the fact that Malaysia was 
“not a party to the U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or to 
any of the core human rights treaties,” as reasoning for striking down the 
agreement.30  Essentially, the 800 Australian IMAs could have been subject 
to inhumane treatment and not afforded the rights they would have received 
                                                                                                                   
2001 (Cth) (Austl.).  See also Catherine Skulan, Australia’s Mandatory Detention of 
“Unauthorized” Asylum Seekers: History, Politics, and Analysis Under International Law, 21 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 61, 73–74 (2006).  
 21 Skulan, supra note 20, at 73–74. 
 22 Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 594. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  Additionally, this legislation was challenged as being unconstitutional in Plaintiff 
M61/2010E v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 41 (Austl.).  The High Court of Australia affirmed 
the constitutionality of the Act.   
 25 Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 585. 
 26 Crock, supra note 15, at 256–66. 
 27 Id. at 264–65. 
 28 Id.  
 29 Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144 
(Austl.).  
 30 Crock, supra note 15, at 265.  
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in Australia because Australia is a signatory to several human rights treaties 
of which Malaysia is not.31  
After the failure of the Malaysia Solution, the Migration Legislation 
Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act of 2012 
established a regional processing scheme once more.32  The purpose of this 
2012 Act was to distance the Australian courts from refugee claims made by 
illegal maritime arrivals.33  The Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection of the Australian government defines “illegal maritime arrivals” 
as any individual who arrived to Australia illegally by boat.34  The Migration 
Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals) Act of 2013 further denied 
any unauthorized maritime arrivals the “right to seek asylum or to apply for 
any form of visa in Australia.”35  Yet another statute, the Maritime Powers 
Act of 2013,36 expanded the power of Australian authorities to intercept 
boats at sea and board, seize, search, and detain all individuals and vessels.  
Authorities are also permitted to “board vessels, and require the person in 
charge to stop, manoeuvre or adopt a specified course.”37 
Following the return of the Pacific Solution, the Australian government 
began the process of entering into several ‘Regional Resettlement 
Arrangements’ and ‘Memoranda of Understandings’ with various states.38  
The regional resettlement agreements imply that irregular maritime arrivals 
arriving to Australia by boat will essentially never have the opportunity to 
settle in Australia because they will be immediately transferred to an 
offshore detention facility and will be unable to apply for a protection visa in 
Australia.39  Australia’s memoranda of understanding with Nauru, a 
sovereign state in the South Pacific, states that the government of Nauru will 
settle individuals who are found to be in need of international protection.40  
                                                                                                                   
 31 Id.   
 32 Id. at 265–67.  
 33 Id. 
 34 Illegal Maritime Arrivals, http://www.ima.border.gov.au/en/illegal-maritime-arrivals.  
 35 Crock, supra note 15, at 249. 
 36 Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (Austl.).  
 37 Natalie Klein, Assessing Australia’s Push Back the Boats Policy under International 
Law: Legality and Accountability for Maritime Interceptions of Irregular Migrants, 15 MELB. 
J. INT’L L. 414, 439–40; Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (Austl.).  
 38 Crock, supra note 15. 
 39 As of August 2015, over 1,000 men are still being detained at the Manus Island facility.  
Many of these individuals have been detained for over two years and are genuine refugees by 
United Nations’ standards.  Transfer of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries, https://www.hum 
anrights.gov.au/our-work/asylum-seekers-and-refugees/projects/transfer-asylum-seekers-third 
-countries [hereinafter Transfer of Asylum Seekers]; see also Liam Cochrane, Goodbye, 
Manus: A Beautiful Island in the Shadow of a Detention Centre, http://www.abc.net.au/am/co 
ntent/2015/s4302534.htm. 
 40 Transfer of Asylum Seekers, supra note 39; see also Crock, supra note 15, at 3. 
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In Nauru, irregular maritime arrivals are given “an Australian Regional 
Processing Visa valid for an initial period of three months, renewable 
indefinitely as long as the Australian government continues to pay the $1000 
monthly visa charge.”41  Likewise, the memoranda of understanding with 
Papau New Guinea establishes that irregular maritime arrivals who arrive 
after July 19, 2013, will be transferred and have their asylum claims 
processed in and under the laws of Papua New Guinea.42  However, there is 
“no visa equivalent to the Australian Regional Processing Visa,”43 in Papua 
New Guinea.  This means that refugees on Papua New Guinea, “remain 
without status, and are simply tolerated by the government in fulfilment of its 
diplomatic promises to Australia.”44  One problem with these agreements is 
that they were written in non-binding language and contain little to no human 
rights provisions.45 
Additionally in 2013, the Australian government engaged in efforts to 
essentially push back boats en route to Australia with the initiation of the 
Operation Sovereign Borders.46  As Natalie Klein explains, “[t]his policy 
involves Australian officials preventing the passage of vessels carrying 
irregular migrants so they are unable to reach Australian territory.”47  Under 
these various agreements and government acts, any unauthorized refugee or 
asylum seeker arriving to Australia by boat will be removed to one of these 
offshore detention facilities and will never be given the chance to resettle in 
Australia.   
As of August 31, 2015, 1,589 individuals were being detained at the 
Manus Island and the Nauru detention centers.48  The average detainment 
time for these individuals was 412 days.49  To date “Australia defends its 
                                                                                                                   
 41 Crock, supra note 15, at 272. 
 42 Transfer of Asylum Seekers, supra note 39 (this arrangement has also been referred to as 
the “PNG Solution”); see also Azadeh Dastyari, Detention of Australia’s Asylum Seekers in 
Nauru: Is Deprivation of Liberty by Any Other Name Just as Unlawful?, 38 U. N.S.W. L.J. 
669, 672 (2015) (explaining that individuals who will be transferred to Nauru consist of those 
“who a) have travelled irregularly by sea to Australia; or b) have been intercepted by 
Australian authorities in the course of trying to reach Australia by irregular maritime means; 
and c) are authorised by Australian law to be transferred to Naura; and d) have undergone 
short health, security and identity checks in Australia”). 
 43 Crock, supra note 15, at 272.  
 44 Id.  
 45 Id. at 276.  
 46 Klein, supra note 37, at 415. 
 47 Id.  
 48 Detention and Refugee Statistics, ASYLUM SEEKER RESOURCE CTR., http://www.asrc.org. 
au/resources/statistics/detention-and-refugee-statistics/. 
 49 Id.  
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policy of mandatory detention of unauthorized asylum seekers pursuant to its 
sovereign power to enact laws to protect its borders.”50   
C.  The Murder of Reza Barati  
Reza Barati was a twenty-three year-old Iranian immigrant who arrived in 
Australia on July 24, 2013; only five days shy of obtaining the opportunity to 
be resettled in Australia.51  Because Barati arrived after July 19, 2013, he was 
unable to request asylum in Australia due to Australia’s memorandum of 
understanding with Papua New Guinea, and was subsequently transferred to 
the Manus Island detention center in Papua New Guinea.52  The two-day 
riots in February 2014 that plagued the Manus Island detention center can be 
attributed to several factors: “increasing tension in the centre and the 
transferees’ frustration and anxiety caused by anger at being [brought] to 
Papua New Guinea,” delays in processing times of refugee status, and the 
lack of information concerning the transferees’ length stay at the detention 
center.53  Additionally, the increasingly militarized conditions in the 
detention centers did not aid the escalating tensions.54  
Along with the injuries Barati obtained during the riots, several other 
detainees were shot or beaten, and one man had his throat cut with a knife.55  
Joshua Kaluvia and Louie Efi, local workers at the detention center, were the 
only two people charged in the murder of Reza Barati, though eyewitnesses 
reported that several Australian expatriates participated in Reza’s beatings as 
well.56 
                                                                                                                   
 50 Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 596. 
 51 Laughland, supra note 1. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Morrison Releases Manus Island Riot Report, SBS (June 3, 2014), http://www.sbs.com. 
au/news/article/2014/05/27/morrison-releases-manus-island-riot-report.  
 54 The Manus Island detention facility is a former WWII military base surrounded by 
locked gates and armed guards.  Locked fences and armed security guards also surround each 
living compound inside the facility.  Amnesty International, This is Breaking People: Human 
Rights Violations At Australia’s Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on Manus Island, Papua 
New Guinea, 36–38 (2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA12/002/2013/en/.  
See also Skulan, supra note 20, at 91–92 (restating a description by a Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunities Commission Report that Australian detention centers impose 
“unreasonable restrictions on the movement of detainees; limited recreational and educational 
opportunities; over-crowding and lack of privacy; inadequate . . . lighting and 
ventilation . . . and a lack of health care services”). 
 55 Brewster & Richards, supra note 2. 
 56 Ben Doherty, Men Accused of Reza Barati’s Death in Manus Detention Centre Stand 
Trial, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/sep/ 
21/men-accused-of-reza-baratis-death-in-manus-detention-centre-stand-trial. 
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In March 2015, the U.N. Human Rights Council condemned the Australian 
government, asserting that the government’s response to an inquiry by the 
Special Rapporteur concerning the ill treatment and torture of two detainees 
who witnessed the violent events that occurred at the Manus Island detention 
facility on February 16 to 18 in 2014, was insufficient.57  In its November 
2014 inquiry, the Special Rapporteur addressed pressing concerns about the 
status of two detainees who had been “tied . . . to chairs and 
threatened . . . with physical violence, rape and criminal prosecution . . . if they 
refused to retract the statements that they had made to the Royal Papua New 
Guinea Constabulary and to G4S regarding the violent attacks,” that occurred 
at the Manus Island detention center in February 2014.58  Furthermore, these 
two unnamed refugees were reported to have repeatedly been forced to sleep 
on the floor with only bread and water to eat.59  These witnesses received 
multiple death threats and were consistently targeted by guards at the Manus 
Island detention center for abuse.60  One eyewitness, Barait’s roommate and a 
Kurdish refugee by the name of Benham Satah, was forcibly taken to testify 
against Joshua Kaluvia and Louie Efi, who were charged with the murder of 
Reza Barati.61  Satah initially refused, but later agreed, to testify only under the 
promise by a judge of enhanced protection.62  No action was brought against 
any of the Australian expatriates who were employed at the Manus Island 
detention center at the time of the attack.63  
At the time of the February 2014 riots, both the Manus Island and the 
Nauru detention centers were operated by a private security firm, G4S.64  
Previously known as ‘GSL,’ the firm had a history of detention center abuse 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 3. 
 58 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mandates of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression; the 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders; the Chair-Rapporteur of the 
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries; the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants; and the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Nov. 17, 2014), https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/28th/public_-_ua_aus 
tralia_17.11.14_(4.2014)_pro.pdf.  
 59 Id.  
 60 Ben Doherty, Witness in Reza Barati Murder Trial Says He is Dogged by Death Threats, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/oct/23/wit 
ness-in-reza-barati-trial-says-he-is-dogged-by-death-threats.  
 61 Id.  
 62 Id.  
 63 Id.  
 64 Jamie Smyth & Gill Plimmer, G4S to Hand Over Australia Asylum Centre Contract to 
Transfield, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/ef5bf766-9d24-11e3-a59 
9-00144feab7de. 
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at the time it contracted with the Australian government in 2012.65  In 2013, 
G4S declined to comply with a Freedom of Information request put forth by 
Guardian Australia, an online version of the British-print newspaper The 
Guardian.66  The reports requested by Guardian Australia were mandated by 
the Australian Department of Immigration to be submitted at the close of 
every month in order to assess and oversee the operations of the detention 
center.67  Guardian Australia reported that the reports in question did not 
actually exist and that G4S was failing in its obligation to report the 
conditions of the detention centers.68  Following the Manus Island riots, 
Australia’s contract with G4S was terminated, and the Nauru and Manus 
Island detention centers have since been run by Transfield Services under a 
contract for $1.2 billion lasting twenty months.69  
D.  The Return of the Tamil Population to Sri Lanka 
In July 2014, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants and 
the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment voiced their concerns about Australia’s policy and 
decisions regarding two sets of Sri Lankan asylum seekers.70  The first set of 
people were members of the Tamil population from Sri Lanka and were 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Jay Fletcher, Notorious Firm G4S to Run Refugee Prison Camp on Manus Island, GREEN 
LEFT WKLY. (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/notorious-firm-g4s-run-
refugee-prison-camp-manus-island.  A 2005 inquiry into the firm uncovered that GSL did not 
provide psychiatric care to mentally ill detainees and detained a three-year old for her entire 
life.  The company was also faulted with multiple reports of abuse and the deaths of numerous 
individuals under its care.  
 66 Paul Farrell & Oliver Laughland, G4S and Serco Fail to Report on Australia’s Asylum 
Centre Conditions, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/20 
13/sep/16/g4s-serco-australia-asylum-centre. 
 67 Id.  
 68 Id.  
 69 Ben Doherty, Tansfield Named Coalition’s ‘Preferred Tenderer’ for Manus and Nauru 
Centers, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/31/tr 
ansfield-named-coalitions-preferred-tenderer-for-manus-and-nauru-centres.  Transfield Services 
is not without its fair share of discomforting allegations.  The staff of Transfield Services has 
been accused of rape and sexual assault on detainees, and Transfield Services’ bosses refused to 
answer detailed questions concerning the conditions at the detention centers during a Senate 
hearing.  Additionally, subcontractors of Transfield Services have been accused of “handcuffing 
children . . . assaulting asylum seekers who were handcuffed, and running a secret solitary 
confinement facility on Manus.” 
 70 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mandates of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Human Rights of Migrants and the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (July 8, 2014), https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/28t 
h/public_-_ua_australia_08.07.14_(2.2014).pdf [hereinafter Mandates of the Special Rapporteur 
on Torture].  See also Klein, supra note 37, at 415. 
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traveling to Christmas Island, an island territory of Australia,71 when they 
were intercepted on June 29, 2014, by Australian authorities.72  It was not 
until legal action was brought against the Australian government on July 7, 
2014, in a case entitled CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection73 that the government finally admitted to detaining the refugees at 
sea.74  The anonymous plaintiff in the case was a Sri Lankan of the Tamil 
minority who had originally fled to India to escape persecution due to his 
political involvements while living in Sri Lanka.75  Detained at sea for 
roughly a month, these asylum seekers were housed in a windowless room 
with roughly eighty other people for twenty-two hours.76  They were finally 
brought to the Australian mainland via the Cocos Islands, and “with the legal 
team urgently requesting permission to visit them, they were secretively 
taken with no warning to Australia’s detention centre on Nauru in an 
overnight flight.”77  
The second boat of asylum seekers was no luckier than the first.  This 
boat, containing fifty Sri Lankan asylum seekers, was intercepted by 
Australian vessels.  These asylum seekers were subjected to an expedited 
screening process “involving a single, four-question interview conducted on 
the high seas without any legal assistance.”78  Although 50% to 90%79 of 
people leaving Sri Lanka for Australia are in genuine need of protection, 
forty-one out of the fifty on this boat were handed over to “Sri Lankan 
authorities during a transfer at sea.”80  Since 2012,81 Sri Lankans are the only 
                                                                                                                   
 71 Id. 
 72 Human Rights Law Centre, High Court Finds High Seas Detention of 157 Asylum 
Seekers Did Not Breach Australian Domestic Law (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.hrlc.org.au/hu 
man-rights-case-summaries/high-court-finds-high-seas-detention-of-157-asylum-seekers-did-
not-breach-australian-domestic-law [hereinafter High Court Finds High Seas Detention of 157 
Asylum Seekers Did Not Breach Australian Domestic Law].  
 73 CPCF v Immigration for Minister and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1 (Austl.). 
 74 High Court Finds High Seas Detention of 157 Asylum Seekers Did Not Breach Australian 
Domestic Law, supra note 72. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Ben Doherty & Paul Farrell, Detention of 157 Tamil asylum seekers on board ship ruled 
lawful, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/07/austra 
lia-returns-asylum-seekers-to-sri-lanka-what-happens-next.  
 77 Id.  
 78 Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 70.  
 79 Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay: Australia’s Interception and Return of Sri Lankan Asylum 
Seekers, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CENTRE (Mar. 2014), http://www.australianchurchesrefugee 
taskforce.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/HRLC_SriLanka_Report_11March2014.pdf 
[hereinafter Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay]. 
 80 Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 70; see Oliver Laughland, Paul 
Farrell & Melissa Davey, Australia Returns Asylum Seekers to Sri Lanka: What Happens Next?, 
THE GUARDIAN (July 7, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/07/australia-returns-
asylum-seekers-to-sri-lanka-what-happens-next. 
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group to be exposed to this so-called ‘enhanced screening’82 without a 
lawyer.  Enhanced screening consists of a four-question interview by two 
officers from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship83 and is not 
subject to review by any other authorities.84  Screened individuals are 
immediately returned to Sri Lanka if they are not determined to be at risk of 
being tortured or subjected to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in Sri Lanka.85  Additionally, “three Sri Lankan Tamil asylum 
seekers on temporary visas in Australia, facing the prospect of being returned 
to Sri Lanka, have set themselves on fire, [and] two of them died.”86  
Though the thirty-year civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) separatists and the Sri Lankan government ended in 2009, the 
Tamil minority still faces serious human rights abuses and persecution.87  The 
LTTE was an organization with the goal of obtaining a “Tamil homeland in 
the Tamil-majority areas in the north and east of the country.”88  During the 
end of the civil war in 2009, over 40,000 civilians lost their lives, with 
atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict.89  The LTTE allegedly used 
human shields, recruited children for combat, and reportedly killed civilians 
who attempted to leave areas controlled by the LTTE.90  The United Nations 
reported that Sri Lankan government forces “deliberately targeted and shelled 
thousands of civilians, persecuted the population and intimidated journalists 
seeking to cover the war.”91  President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka and 
his brothers control roughly 45% to 70% of the Sri Lankan economy, 
according to the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice.92 
Even though the civil war has ended, Navi Pillay, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, said after a visit to Sri Lanka in 2013 
that she was “deeply concerned that Sri Lanka, despite the opportunity 
                                                                                                                   
 81 Australian Human Rights Commission, Tell Me About It: The ‘Enhanced Screening 
Process’ (June 13, 2013), https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publ 
ication/enhanced-screening.pdf [hereinafter Tell Me About It: The Enhanced Screening Process]. 
 82 This enhanced screening includes interviewing Sri Lankan refugees without legal 
representation or “access to legal advice or information about their rights.”  Additionally this 
process disallows Sri Lankan asylum seekers the proper avenue to put forth a claim for 
asylum.  Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay, supra note 79, at 5.  
 83 Tell Me About It: The Enhanced Screening Process, supra note 81, at 1.  
 84 Id. at 2.   
 85 Id. at 1.  
 86 Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 70. 
 87 Id.  
 88 Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay, supra note 79, at 14. 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. (citing Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri 
Lanka (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf). 
 92 Id. at 15. 
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provided by the end of the war to construct a new vibrant all-embracing 
state, is showing signs of heading in an increasingly authoritarian 
direction.”93  Pillay also reported widespread harassment of lawyers and 
intimidation geared towards journalists and human rights defenders.94  In 
January 2013, for example, the Sri Lankan Chief Justice had been ousted 
after handing down judicial decisions that “did not favour the central 
Government.”95  To make matters worse, lawmakers passed the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, which removed presidential term 
limits and granted the president further powers to “appoint judges and senior 
appointees to independent bodies such as the Police Commission, Human 
Rights Commission, and the Elections Commission.”96   
In Sri Lanka, it is illegal to leave the country without departing from an 
authorized port.97  Sri Lankan law enforcement continuously monitors and 
intercepts people attempting to leave, while the Sri Lankan Navy “conducts 
on-water interception of boats and takes the passengers to a nearby base.”98  
Australia has aided in Sri Lanka’s efforts to stop asylum seekers from 
leaving the country by providing millions of dollars to the Sri Lankan Navy, 
as well as a “$2 million gift of two patrol boats to the Sri Lankan Navy, 
ostensibly to be used for ‘humanitarian purposes’ to ‘ensure the safety of life 
at sea.’ ”99  This aid has come pursuant to a 2009 Memorandum of 
Understanding aimed at “preventing and responding to migrant smuggling 
and related activity.”100   
                                                                                                                   
 93 Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening remarks at a press 
conference during her mission to Sri Lanka Colombo (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display News.aspx?NewsID=13673; see also Sri Lanka Campaign for 
Peace and Justice, The Rajapaksas: keeping it in the family, INFOGRAPHIC, http://1.bp.blogsp 
ot.com/-llj21DHtNvY/UoiIjldpOI/AAAAAAAAAWY/4GeUkUYXzOM/s1600/sri+figure_2 
0.03.13.jpg.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay, supra note 79, at 15. 
 96 PARLIAMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA: EIGHTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION (Sept. 2010), http://www.parliament.lk/files/pdf/constitutio 
n/18th_amendment_act.pdf (citing Oral update of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka’, UN Doc. A/HRC/24/CRP.3/Rev.1, 23 
Sept. 2013, ¶ 26, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session24/Docum 
ents/A-HRC-24-CRP-3-Rev1_en.doc).  
 97 Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay, supra note 79, at 34. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id. at 25. 
 100 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of Sri Lanka concerning Legal Cooperation against the Smuggling of Migrants 
(Nov. 9, 2009) (on file with the HRLC).  
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As of August 2014, over 1,000 Sri Lankan Tamils who sought asylum in 
Australia have been returned to Sri Lanka.101  With the increasing number of 
irregular maritime arrivals, this number will most likely increase rather than 
decrease, which may lead to an increase in refoulement.  
III.  APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment entered into force on June 26, 1987.  The overt 
purpose of the Convention is “to make more effective the struggle against 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
throughout the world.”102   By joining the Convention, state parties obligated 
themselves to impose “formal and non-formal arrangements at the domestic 
level to prevent torture from occurring within the state and its territories.”103  
Territorial waters, excised migration zones, exclusive economic zones, as 
well as flag-flying ships and aircraft are all deemed to be “territories” for 
purposes of the CAT.104  As a state party since 1989, Australia is bound by 
the provisions of the CAT.105   
The Committee Against Torture (The Committee), created by Article 17 
of the Convention, oversees state adherence.106  The Committee is permitted 
“to hear complaints by individuals of alleged violations of the treaty by states 
parties that have recognized the Committee’s competence to consider these 
disputes.”107  If the Committee Against Torture reliably learns of possible 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Muditha Dias, How Bad is the Situation for Tamil Asylum Seekers in Sri Lanka?, 
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/radionati 
onal/programs/latenightlive/how-bad-is-the-situation-for-tamil-asylum-seekers-in-sri-lanka/5 
650338. 
 102 Convention Against Torture, supra note 6. 
 103 Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya, Reinforcing Refugee Protection in the Wake of the War of 
Terror, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 277, 295 (2007).  The General Comment states that 
these domestic laws must be designed to protect all individuals, “regardless of race, colour, 
ethnicity, age, religious belief . . . including persons accused of political offences or terrorist 
acts, asylum-seekers, refugees or others under international protection, or any other status or 
adverse distinction.”  U.N. Office of the High Comm’n on Human Rights, Comm. Against 
Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of article 2 by States parties, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008).  
 104 Odhiambo-Abuya, supra note 103. 
 105 Skulan, supra note 20, at 102. 
 106 Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 17.1. See also Samuel L. David, A Foul 
Immigration Policy: U.S. Misinterpretation of the Non-Refoulement Obligation Under the 
Convention Against Torture, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 769, 773 (2003).  
 107 David, supra note 106, at 773.  See also Julia Hall, The Convention’s Nonrefoulement 
Obligation in the Context of the “War on Terror,” 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 46, 47 (2010) 
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violations of the CAT, the Committee will ask for the cooperation of the 
State in question “to submit observations with regard to the information 
concerned.”108  The Committee is composed of ten experts “elected by secret 
ballot from a list of persons submitted by Member States,”109 who serve for 
four years110 and must “possess ‘high moral standing’ and ‘recognized 
competence’ in the area of human rights.”111   
 It is also worth noting that pursuant to the CAT’s definition of torture, 
the acts in question must have been “inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in 
an official capacity.”112  Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya in Reinforcing Refugee 
Protection in the Wake of the War of Terror, pointed out that it would be 
irrational to believe that “acts committed by State-controlled or State-
supported vigilante, death squads, or paramilitary groups will be prosecuted 
domestically.”113  A state is said to acquiesce in torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment when the state “willingly 
fails to take action to prevent its commission.”114   
In a case before the Committee Against Torture in 1998, entitled G.R.B. 
v. Sweden,115 the complainant claimed that refoulement to Peru would violate 
                                                                                                                   
(explaining that “forms of evidence that can be submitted include . . . mass violations of 
human rights, the past torture of a person, medical evidence of that past torture or ill 
treatment, changes on the ground since the person had been mistreated that indicate at this 
point the person would be safer elsewhere”). 
 108 Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 20.1. 
 109 Odhiambo-Abuya, supra note 103, at 282. 
 110 Id.  
 111 Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 17.1.  
 112 Id. art. 1.1.  But see David, supra note 106, at 774–79 for a discussion of three separate 
cases explaining the various interpretations of what constitutes a person acting in an official 
capacity.  See also Patricia J. Freshwater, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement Under the 
Convention Against Torture: When Has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in the Torture of Its 
Citizens?, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 585, 603 (2005) (explaining, “the involvement of any level of 
government official is strong evidence that the government has acquiesced in the torture.  
Evidence of government officials’ participation in acts of torture should give rise to a strong 
presumption that the government has acquiesced, regardless of the rank of the government 
official”); see also David, supra note 106, at 804–05 (concluding that the non-refoulement 
obligation under Article 3 of the CAT necessarily includes some non-state actors that operate 
“outside of state control”). 
 113 Odhiambo-Ayuba, supra note 103, at 288.  
 114 Id. at 289.  See also Hajrizi Dzemajl v. Yugoslavia, Communication No. 161/2000, 
Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 9.2 (finding that Yugoslavia acquiesced in the 
torture of people of Romani origin because the police, “had been informed of the immediate 
risk that the complainants were facing and had been present at the scene of the events [and] 
did not take any appropriate steps in order to protect the complainants”). 
 115 G.R.B. v. Sweden, Communication No. 83/1997, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 
¶ 2.1 (1998). 
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Article 3 of the CAT on the basis that her and her family were part of the 
Communist Party in Peru.116  The complainant claimed her parents had been 
imprisoned by Peruvian authorities, that her father had been tortured, and 
that she had been imprisoned and raped by “members of the Sendero 
Luminoso, a guerilla group opposing the Peruvian government.”117  The 
Committee Against Torture found for Sweden and reasoned that, “the issue 
whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person 
who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity, 
without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the 
scope [of] article 3 of the Convention.”118 
The Committee moved away from its decision in G.R.B. v. Sweden in 
1999 in the landmark case of Elmi v. Australia,119 in which the Committee 
ruled that it would be a violation of Article 3 to return the complainant to 
Somalia because, in the Committee’s words, he was at a substantial risk of 
being tortured by “certain Somali clans rather than an actual government.”120  
In this case, several warring factions in Somalia had established “quasi-
governmental institutions.”121  The Committee wrote that “when private 
persons exercise government functions they can be considered ‘public 
officials or other persons acting in an official capacity.’ ”122  In 2001, the 
Committee failed to follow its own decision in S.V. v. Canada123 when it 
ruled that refoulement of Sri Lankans who claimed to be at risk of torture or 
persecution by the Sri Lankan authorities and members of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam would not violate Article 3.124   
Samuel L. David argues that travaux preparatoires of the Convention 
Against Torture pointed to a broad interpretation of Article 3.125  Though the 
main focus of the drafters of the CAT was torture carried out by states, 
various working groups voiced their concerns and were “troubled by the 
                                                                                                                   
 116 Id.  See also David, supra note 106, at 774–75.  
 117 David, supra note 106, at 775; G.R.B. v. Sweden, Communication No. 83/1997, 
Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 2.3 (1998).  
 118 David, supra note 106, at 775; G.R.B. v. Sweden, Communication No. 83/1997, 
Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 6.5 (1998).  
 119 Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture 
(1999).  
 120 David, supra note 106, at 775.  
 121 Id. at 776. 
 122 Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 1.   
 123 S.V. v. Canada, Communication No. 1827/2008, Decision, U.N. ICCPR Human Rights 
Comm. (July, 23 2012).  
 124 David, supra note 106, at 777.  
 125 Id. at 785.  Furthermore, the CAT was initially modeled after the Declaration on the 
Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Declaration on Torture). 
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omission of non-state actors from the original draft.”126  The final 
compromise led to the current provision that includes “other person[s] acting 
in an official capacity.”127 
A.  What Exactly Constitutes “Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment” 
When most people think of torture, the first thought that may come to 
mind is torture in the traditional sense.  This may include “being whipped or 
beaten to secure a confession,” or other forms of “exotic” physical abuse.128  
Although torture is defined in the CAT as “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person,”129 the precise definition of what constitutes cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment remains unclear.  Torture can include acts 
used to obtain a confession from a third person, “punishing him for an act he 
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,”130 or 
intimidation.131  However, pain and suffering deriving from lawful acts or 
sanctions cannot be considered torture under the CAT.132  
Regarding inhuman treatment, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross defined inhuman treatment as the infliction of “severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering.”133  Mental suffering can include “keeping a strong 
light on in a jail cell, playing loud music 24 hours a day, or constantly 
awakening a person during the night.”134   
Additionally, two decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia regarded inhuman treatment as any act “which ‘causes 
serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack 
on human dignity.’ ”135  For individuals in detention centers, lack of water, 
food, and medical treatment as well as other poor conditions have all been 
deemed to be inhuman treatment.  This line of reasoning is consistent with 
the 2014 decision of the Committee Against Torture in Kirsanov v. Russian 
                                                                                                                   
 126 Id. at 786.  
 127 Id. at 788. 
 128 Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 210 (2003). 
 129 Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 1.1. 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id.  
 132 Id.  
 133 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 90. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule90 (citing Elements of 
Crimes for the ICC, Definition of Inhuman Treatment as a War Crime (ICC Statute, Article 
8(2)(a)(ii))) [hereinafter Rule 90]. 
 134 Strauss, supra note 128, at 211.  
 135 Rule 90, supra note 133.  
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Federation.136  In that case, the Committee Against Torture found the 
Russian Federation in violation of Article 16 of the CAT, along with several 
other articles, due to the conditions that the complainant had endured in 
detention.  The Committee credited his allegations that he had been exposed 
to other detainees who routinely smoked, that he was not allowed to leave his 
cell to exercise, and that he was not given bedding or toiletry items during 
his detention.137  The Committee further reported that although the 
respondent state had detained the complainant for a prolonged period of 
time, the conditions in which he was detained did not amount to “severe pain 
and suffering”138 under the definition of Article 1 of the CAT concerning 
torture.  The Committee did find, however, that the detainment conditions 
violated Article 16 of the CAT and amounted to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.139 
Furthermore, in a 2012 case, Fatou Sonko v. Spain, the Committee found 
that by subjugating the complainant “to physical and mental suffering prior 
to his death, aggravated by his particular vulnerability as a migrant,” the 
state’s actions did “exceed the threshold of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, under the terms of Article 16 of the Convention.”140  
The complainant was a Senegalese migrant attempting to reach Spain by 
“swimming along the coast between Belionex and Benzu”141 with only a 
wetsuit and a dinghy.  He had been intercepted by Spanish Civil Guard 
officers and was forced to jump into Moroccan territorial waters.142  While 
hanging onto the rail of the vessel, the complainant repeatedly told the Civil 
Guard officers that he could not swim.143  The officers forced him to let go of 
the vessel, and he subsequently drowned.144  Although the Civil Guard 
officers’ actions did not amount to torture under Article 1, the Committee 
ruled and concluded that their actions were in violation of Article 16.145 
Additionally, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment wrote that 
                                                                                                                   
 136 Kirsanov v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 478/2011, Decision, U.N. CAT 
Comm. Against Torture (May 14, 2014). 
 137 Id. ¶ 2.3. 
 138 Id. ¶ 11.2. 
 139 Id.  
 140 Fernando M. Marino Menendez, Recent Jurisprudence of the United Nations Committee 
against Torture and the International Protection of Refugees, 34 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 61, 69 
(2015). 
 141 Sonko v. Spain, Communication No. 368/2008, Decision, U.N. CAT Comm. Against 
Torture, ¶ 10.4 (Nov. 25, 2011). 
 142 Id.  
 143 Id. ¶ 2.2. 
 144 Id.  
 145 Id. ¶ 10.4.  
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organizations should focus on the “purpose of the conduct and the 
powerlessness of the victim, rather than the intensity of the pain or suffering 
inflicted.”146  The European Court of Human Rights set a minimum threshold 
for circumstances that might amount to inhuman or degrading treatment in 
1976 in Ireland v. United Kingdom.147  These circumstances include the 
“duration of treatment; physical effects of treatment; mental effects of 
treatment; and sex, age, and state of health of the victim.”148 
B.  What Constitutes “substantial grounds” in Deciding Refoulement 
As well as prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, the CAT prohibits any state party from “return[ing] 
(‘refouler’) or extradite[ing] a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.”149  The non-refoulement provision also includes 
situations where an individual is returned to a state and then transferred to 
another state where the individual is at a substantial risk of torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.150  Mary Crock 
pointed out that a “state cannot abdicate its responsibilities by deflecting 
refugees to a State that will not comply with the terms”151 of human rights 
treaties.  Essentially, “what cannot be done directly cannot be done 
indirectly.”152  Furthermore, the non-refoulement provisions of the CAT 
apply to all individuals regardless of whether they have been deemed 
                                                                                                                   
 146 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Interpretation of Torture in the 
Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International Bodies, 1, 7 (2011), http://www. 
ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Torture/UNVFVT/Interpretation_torture_2011_EN.pdf (citing 
Manfred Nowak, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/6 (Dec. 20, 2005)). 
 147 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 376–79 (1976). 
 148 Interpretation of Torture in the Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International 
Bodies, supra note 146, at 7.  
 149 Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 3.1.  See also Ktiti v. Morocco, 
Communication No. 419/2010, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ ?? (2011); 
Kalinichenko v. Morocco, Communication No. 428/2010, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against 
Torture, ¶ ?? (2012).  
 150 David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights 
Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 8 (1999) (citing Mutombo v. Switzerland, Communication 
No. 13/1993, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 45 (1994)).  
 151 Crock, supra note 15, at 275–76 (citing UNHCR Executive Comm. Conclusion No. 85 
(1998); Executive Comm. Conclusion No. 87 (1999)). 
 152 Crock, supra note 15, at 275. 
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refugees or asylum seekers,153 or whether they have entered a state legally or 
illegally.154  The non-refoulement obligation also applies in a case of 
extradition, although this raises possible conflicts with the commitments 
states’ have made under extradition treaties.155  However, two key agents in 
the drafting of the CAT, Herman Burgers and Hans Delenius, asserted that 
after a state has ratified the CAT, the state “must refrain from assuming 
obligations contrary to the objectives of the Convention.”156  The drafters 
contended that the non-refoulement provision was so necessary they went as 
far as suggesting that “even previously ratified extradition treaties may well 
be construed to have been supplemented by the non-refoulement exception 
provided in Article 3.”157  Additionally, “this obligation is considered a norm 
of customary international law subject neither to limitations for national 
security reasons nor to derogation in times of public emergency.”158   
In 1997, the Committee Against Torture adopted various sets of 
guidelines to aid in understanding exactly what constitutes “substantial 
grounds”159 in deciding whether an individual would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.160  The Committee’s guidelines identified several factors 
that are relevant to this analysis: 
(a) Is the State concerned one in which there is evidence of a 
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of 
human rights (see Article 3, paragraph 2)? 
(b)  Has the author been tortured or maltreated by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent of acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity in the 
past?  If so, was this the recent past? 
(c) Is there medical or other independent evidence to support 
a claim by the author that he/she has been tortured or 
maltreated in the past?  Has the torture had after-effects? 
                                                                                                                   
 153 But see Convention on Refugees, supra note 10 (applying non-refoulement provisions 
only to refugees). 
 154 Weissbordt & Hortreiter, supra note 150, at 7. 
 155 Id. at 7–8. 
 156 Id. at 8.  
 157 Id.  
 158 Torture and Diplomatic Assurances, 446, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploa 
ds/2013/12/Alston-Goodman-Torture-and-Diplomatic-Assurances-International-Human-Right 
s-OUP.pdf; see also Menendez, supra note 140, at 62. 
 159 Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 3.1.  
 160 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CAT General Comment No. 1: 
Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22 (Refoulement and 
Communication) (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter CAT General Comment No. 1]. 
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(d) Has the situation referred to in (a) above changed?  Has 
the internal situation in respect of human rights altered? 
(e) Has the author engaged in political or other activity 
within or outside the State concerned which would appear to 
make him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed 
in danger of torture where he/she to be expelled, returned or 
extradited to the State in question? 
(f) Is there any evidence as to the credibility of the author? 
(g) Are there factual inconsistencies in the claim of the 
author?  If so, are they relevant?161 
The risk of torture must be a personal, real, and foreseeable risk and must be 
“assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion,” rather than 
the enhanced burden of “highly probable.”162  A complainant at risk of being 
returned to a state is not automatically guaranteed his or her wish of non-
refoulement simply because the state has a pattern of human rights 
violations, including torture or cruel punishment.  Likewise, a complainant at 
risk of refoulement to a state without a history of flagrant human rights 
violations will not automatically be denied protection.  David Weissbrodt 
and Isabel Hortrieter pointed out that the “substantial grounds” test is 
evaluated both subjectively and objectively.163 
There is a lack of jurisprudence as to whether Article 3 of the CAT refers 
exclusively to refoulement in instances of torture or if it also includes the risk 
of other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.164  Article 3.1 
of the CAT specifically refers to “substantial grounds” for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.165  Fernando M. Marino 
Menendez argued that the line between torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment is slowly dissolving in this context.166  In 
assessing the risk of torture suffered by the complainant in H.K v. 
Switzerland167 in 2013, the Committee indicated that other cruel, inhuman or 
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degrading treatment or punishment would be substantial grounds for non-
refoulement.  The Committee concluded, however, that the individual “ha[d] 
not submitted any evidence supporting her claims of having been severely 
ill-treated by the Ethiopian military prior to her arrival in Switzerland.”168  In 
Fatou Sonko v. Spain,169 the Committee furthered this interpretation by 
declaring that, “the prohibition of ill-treatment is absolute and . . . [it’s] 
prevention is an effective and non-derogable measure.”170   
In E.C. v. Switzerland171 the Committee considered a claim put forth by a 
former member of the Gambian National Army who had involuntarily been 
involved in a coup against the President of Gambia in 2006.172  The 
complainant’s superior had ordered him to sever all lines of communication 
within Gambia.173  The complainant contended that he followed the order out 
of fear “of the potential consequences of refusal.”174  The coup eventually 
failed, and the President of Gambia stated that “all those involved would be 
severely punished.”175  After the complainant fled Gambia to Switzerland, 
the complainant’s brother, who still resided in Gambia, was interrogated and 
beaten in an effort to obtain information about the complainant’s 
involvement with the coup.  The Committee ruled that it would not be a 
violation of Article 3 of the CAT for Switzerland to refuse asylum to the 
complainant.176  The Committee reasoned that the complainant “had failed to 
substantiate a present and personal risk of being tortured by state authorities 
if returned,” because eight years had passed since the attempted coup, and 
the complainant had put forth no evidence that the Gambian authorities were 
still looking for him.177  Additionally, the burden of proof was on the 
complainant, and the complainant offered no evidence or any “satisfactory 
explanation for the contradictions noted by the authorities of the State party 
during the asylum proceedings.”178 
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In the context of non-refoulement, one defense often put forth by states is 
that the individual in question was never technically in or under the control 
of the state’s territory, and therefore, the state’s non-refoulement obligations 
under the Convention were never triggered.  Article 2.1 of the CAT charges 
states with implementing measures to “prevent acts of torture in any territory 
under its jurisdiction.”179  Theodore Van Boven explained that General 
Comment 2 of the CAT, when referring to the “scope of the ‘territory’, 
includes situations where a state party exercises, directly or indirectly de jure 
or de facto control over a person.”180  This is exemplified in Sonko v. Spain 
in which Spanish Civil Guard Officers brought four swimming migrants 
aboard their vessel and then forced them to jump into deep waters.  In its 
decision, the Committee “observe[d] that the Civil Guard officers exercised 
control over the persons on board the vessel and were therefore responsible 
for their safety.”181  
Countervailing to the purposes of the CAT, the United States 
implemented a program during the 1960s and 1970s in which the United 
States intercepted Haitian boats routed to the United States to undertake “a 
preliminary screening of individuals to determine if they had credible 
refugee claims.”182  Furthermore in 1992, the United States issued an 
executive order stating that its non-refoulement obligations did not extend 
“outside U.S. land territory.”183  In the case of Sale v. Haitian Centers 
Council Inc.184 in 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the United States’ 
policy of returning vessels carrying Haitian migrants to Haiti “without any 
consideration of their possible refugee status.”185  This decision was highly 
criticized in a dissent by Justice Henry Blackmun as well as in the 1997 
majority decision in Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, 
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which concluded that the act of bringing migrants on board a U.S. vessel 
essentially brought the migrants within U.S. jurisdiction.186  
IV.  AUSTRALIA VIOLATED THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
It is evident that Australia has violated Articles 3 and 16 of the 
Convention Against Torture in regards to non-refoulement and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by applying the previous 
jurisprudence.  
A.  The Murder of Reza Barati and the Subsequent Torture of Eyewitnesses 
Violated the Convention Against Torture 
Though the exact events leading up to the death of Reza Barati and the 
subsequent torture of eyewitnesses remain unclear, one thing is certain: both 
events violated Australia’s obligations under the Convention Against Torture.   
First, it must be determined whether the acts themselves amounted to 
either torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
The death of Barati may not amount to torture in the traditional sense of the 
word, but there is something to be said about the poor conditions he endured 
while at the Manus Island detention center, such as locked fences, armed 
guards, and inadequate lighting and ventilation services.  The Committee 
Against Torture itself has previously deemed lack of bedding, inability to 
exercise, and being exposed to smoke as cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.187  Surely, the conditions that Barati repeatedly 
faced on Manus Island fell into this category. 
Additionally, the circumstances surrounding Barati’s death constituted 
cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment, or punishment.  Barati was beaten with 
a stick embedded with nails and had a rock subsequently thrown down on his 
head by detention center employees.  Barati’s physical and mental suffering 
prior to his death and the additional circumstance of his being a migrant are 
analogous to the Committee’s finding against Spain in Sonko v. Spain.188  If 
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this type of behavior does not amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, it is difficult to ascertain what exactly would meet 
these standards.   
An even clearer case of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment is the treatment reportedly received by two 
eyewitnesses of Reza Barati’s death.  These two individuals were tied to 
chairs and threated with rape, violence, and criminal prosecution in an effort 
to force them to retract their statements concerning the incident.  They were 
threatened further when it was revealed they would be testifying in court 
against the perpetrators.  This is the sort of intimidation and behavior the 
CAT was specifically aimed at preventing when it was originally drafted.  
The broadening interpretation of the CAT supports these findings as well.   
Second, it is necessary to evaluate whether these incidents were “inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”189  Initially, one might 
argue the perpetrators at the Manus Island detention center are not public 
officials or persons acting in an official capacity for purposes of the CAT 
because the operations of the Manus Island detention center are 
subcontracted by the Australian government to private security firms.  The 
Australian government has contended that this shields it from liability 
because these employees are not public officials or acting pursuant to 
government orders.   
The interpretation that negates liability for Australia cannot be allowed.  
Though the Australian government did not directly participate in these 
incidents, it was responsible for the health and well-being of these detainees, 
and an argument can be made that the employees of G4S were acting in an 
official capacity due to the firm’s contract with the Australian government.  
It has already been established that a government cannot do indirectly what it 
is prohibited from doing directly.190   
Australia cannot escape liability simply because it chose to subcontract 
the management of the Manus Island detention center.  At the time of 
contracting with G4S, the Australian government was aware of the numerous 
complaints against the private security firm, yet allowed the firm to take over 
operations of the Manus Island detention center.  Liability for atrocities 
committed by its subcontractors would incentivize Australia and other states 
to continue or even expand the extent to which they subcontract routine 
operations of the government.  Holding the Australian government liable in 
these specific incidents would encourage the state to be more proactive in its 
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stance on and obligations concerning the Convention Against Torture.  It 
would require the government to take specific action when complaints of 
abuse and torture are reported.  
Furthermore, if the notion that G4S was operating in an official capacity 
is not readily accepted, an argument can still be made that the Australian 
government acquiesced in torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment by not actively preventing the incidents and abuses 
from taking place.  It would prove extremely difficult for the Australian 
government to deny it had any knowledge that such abuse and treatment was 
taking place when the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Human 
Rights Watch have all published multiple reports recounting the treatment 
and incidents occurring on Manus Island.  
Furthermore, Australia’s lack of a bill or charter of rights can be partially 
blamed for this acquiescence along with the Australian Court’s propensity to 
not integrate Australia’s international obligations in the Court’s legal 
opinions.  The Australian government has a duty under the Convention 
Against Torture to impose “formal and non-formal arrangements at the 
domestic level to prevent torture from occurring within the State and its 
territories.”191  These territories necessarily include the Manus Island 
detention center, and Australia has failed to implement domestic laws to 
combat the torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment that has consistently occurred there.  The Australian 
government’s expansive legislation concerning offshore detention centers 
and its refusal to allow irregular maritime arrivals the opportunity for asylum 
in Australia have essentially forced these refugees into this position.  
Australia has placed these refugees and asylum seekers in the situation to be 
victims of abuse and torture.  
B.  Inadequate Screening and Return of Sri Lankan Aslum Seekers of the 
Tamil Ethnicity  
For Australia to have violated its non-refoulement obligations under the 
CAT regarding its treatment of Sri Lankan asylum seekers, the asylum 
seekers must have been in Australian territory, and there must have been 
substantial grounds for believing the individual in question would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture if returned to their State of origin.  The 
relevant factors must point to a personal, real, and foreseeable risk that goes 
“beyond mere theory or suspicion,” rather than “highly probable.”192  It 
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makes no difference whether Australia has deemed these individuals asylum 
seekers, because the CAT encompasses the non-refoulement of all 
individuals, not just refugees.  
To begin, it must be determined whether the Sri Lankan asylum seekers 
in question entered Australian territory, effectively implicating Australia’s 
obligation of non-refoulement.  Concerning the first set of Sri Lankan 
asylum seekers who were intercepted on June 29, 2014, it is evident that 
these individuals were in Australian territory.  If credit is to be given to 
Theodore Van Boven’s interpretation of the Convention Against Torture’s 
General Comment No. 2, then de jure or de facto control of an individual 
satisfies the CAT’s territorial requirement.193  Australia’s interception of 
these individuals and their subsequent transportation to the Australian 
mainland triggered Australia’s obligations under the CAT.  Furthermore, 
pursuant to the Committee’s decision in Sonko v. Spain, Australian vessels 
flying the Australian flag essentially “exercised control over the persons on 
board the vessel and were therefore responsible for their safety.”194 
The same analytical process can be used to evaluate whether the second 
set of Sri Lankan asylum seekers intercepted were within Australian territory 
for purposes of the CAT.  Once again, these individuals were intercepted by 
Australian vessels.  Relying on the Committee’s past decisions, including 
Fatou Sonko v. Spain,195 and Theodore Van Boven’s196 elucidation of the 
CAT’s General Comment No. 2, non-refoulement obligations were initiated 
the moment these Australian vessels brought the individuals in question on 
board.   
Next, it must be determined whether there were substantial grounds for 
believing these Sri Lankan asylum seekers were in danger of being subjected 
to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  For 
purposes of this Note, this analysis will only explore if there were substantial 
grounds for believing the second set of Sri Lankan asylum seekers were in 
danger of being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  This is because the first set of Sri Lankan asylum 
seekers discussed were transferred to a detention center on Nauru.  Thus, 
many of these individuals’ current refoulement status is unknown.  In 
contrast, the second set of Sri Lankan asylum seekers were transferred 
directly to Sri Lankan authorities.   
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When attempting to determine whether the refoulement of an individual 
would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the CAT, General Comment 1197 
provides guidance to clarify and aid States.  First, a State should investigate 
whether there is “evidence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights.”198  In this particular instance, the authoritarian 
regime in Sri Lanka abuses and persecutes Sri Lankans of Tamil origin 
because of the long-standing feud between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government.  The Sri Lankan government has a consistent history of killing 
civilians associated with the LTTE and the Tamil minority.  Although a 
State’s history of flagrant human rights violations is not indicative of a 
substantial risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment for an individual who happens to be returned to the state in 
question, it is a relevant factor in the present case in favor of non-
refoulement.   
Importance is also placed on the current human rights situation in the 
state from which the individual in question hailed.199  In Sri Lanka, the Tamil 
minority still faces abuse, persecution, and discrimination by the 
authoritarian government.200  Individuals with ties to the former LTTE are 
sought out and abused.  Individuals who speak out against these abuses, such 
as lawyers and human rights advocates, are also persecuted and abused.  It is 
evident that these human rights violations are consistent and ongoing, 
leading one to conclude that Sri Lanka is continually engaging in “gross, 
flagrant or mass violations”201 of human rights to date.    
A third inquiry regards whether the complainant “has been tortured or 
maltreated by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity in the past.”202  
This suggested factor is a bit more difficult to discern in the present case due 
to the enhanced screening procedures put in place by the Australian 
government.  This screening process, given only to Sri Lankan individuals, 
consists of a mere four questions and cannot possibly give an accurate 
depiction of the individual’s current state of affairs.  These four questions are 
inadequate in determining if an individual is a genuine asylum seeker or at 
risk for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
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if returned to Sri Lanka.  Furthermore, these questions only seek to 
determine whether these individuals are genuine refugees under the Refugee 
Convention.203  Pursuant to its obligations under the CAT, Australia must not 
return any individual when there are substantial grounds for believing that 
individual may face torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment if returned.  Australia’s four-question screening of Sri Lankans 
arriving by boat more likely than not fails in this regard because the 
questions are designed to determine refugee status only.   
Additionally, a State should look for “medical or other independent 
evidence to support a claim by the author that he/she has been tortured or 
maltreated in the past.”204  Once again, the enhanced screening process to 
which Sri Lankan asylum seekers are subjected fails to take this information 
into account.  These individuals arrive with little more than the clothes on 
their backs, much less folders containing medical records from past abuses 
and mistreatment.  Along with this, General Comment No. 1 puts forth the 
question as to whether the complainant has “engaged in political or other 
activity within or outside the State concerned which would appear to make 
him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in danger of 
torture,” if returned to that State.205  The Australian government fails to 
obtain this sort of information and also has no way to determine the 
credibility of the author and if their claims—if they make any—are factually 
consistent. 
Although the factors contained in General Comment 1206 are neither 
exhaustive nor dispositive, they provide a starting point from which to 
evaluate the grounds of whether to return an individual to the state from 
which he or she came.   
The “substantial grounds” test should be evaluated both subjectively and 
objectively, but Australia’s enhanced screening procedures make this 
extremely difficult because of the inadequate nature of the questions asked.  
Furthermore, it has been established that a complainant before the 
Committee carries the burden of proof in proving there are substantial 
grounds for believing the complainant would be in danger of torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if returned.  This is 
simply what the Committee has established for complainants who lodge a 
complaint with the Committee.  This is not the recognized burden for when 
individuals arrive in states seeking protection.  It would be extremely 
burdensome to require individuals who are fleeing from persecution and 
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torture to carry documentation with them as evidence of their torture or cruel 
punishment.  Instead, the state arguably has an obligation to adequately 
investigate whether the individual in question falls within the State’s non-
refoulement obligations under the CAT.   
Australia’s policy of “enhanced screening” does not effectively screen Sri 
Lankan asylum seekers to determine if they are at risk of enduring torture or 
other cruel, inhuman degrading treatment or torture if returned to the State 
from which they traveled.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
As individuals flee parts of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the 
Americas to surrounding states that are party to the Convention Against 
Torture, that state is obligated neither to torture nor to inflict upon that 
person other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  Nor may 
States return any individual to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that individual may be subjected to torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  This obligation is 
non-derogable, and states party to the CAT may not digress from this 
obligation for any reason.207 
Australia’s treatment of Reza Barati, along with the witnesses to his 
death, is clearly a violation of Articles 1 and 16 of the CAT.208  The fact that 
Australia contracted the operations of the Manus Island detention center to 
G4S does not, and should not, absolve Australia of liability under the CAT.  
While awaiting determination of their asylum status, these individuals were 
under the protection and control of the Australian government, and the 
Australian government failed them.  Holding states liable in situations such 
as these will encourage them to take a more proactive approach in 
monitoring the treatment of detainees.  
Though it is not as discernible whether Australia violated its obligations 
under Article 3 of the CAT regarding the refoulement of Sri Lankan asylum 
seekers, it is undisputed that the Australian government owed some duty to 
these individuals in attempting to determine the individual’s risk of torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if returned to the 
State from which they came.  Australia’s enhanced screening of Sri Lankan 
asylum seekers is not an effective procedure to determine the risks these 
individuals possibly face.  Though it might be initially burdensome to enact a 
more thorough screening process, those disadvantages are outweighed by the 
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risk of` returning individuals to States where there are substantial grounds for 
believing the individuals will be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.   
Holding signatories of the CAT to these standards will not only protect 
individuals at risk, such as refugees and asylum seekers, but will also provide 
more oversight and compliance with basic human rights. 
